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ACCENTUATE THE POSITIVE, ELIMINATE THE
NEGATIVE, LATCH ON TO THE AFFIRMATIVE
[ACTION], DO MESS WITH MR. IN-BETWEEN*
Martin H. Belsky**
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court found in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke'-a very close decision-that a program which set quotas
for higher education admissions would be considered to involve reverse
discrimination. This reverse discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell, the
"swing" vote who wrote for the five-member majority, noted, however, that a
program merely taking "race into account" as one factor among others was not
unconstitutional .2
For nearly twenty-five years, the distinction between programs that use
quotas and those that simply take race into account has split the courts and the
general public. Two cases coming out of the University of Michigan were to
decide the issue, it was hoped, once and for all.
On June 23, 2003, the United States Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger
3
reviewed the procedures by which decisions were made to accept or not accept an
undergraduate in the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and
the Arts. The college assigned points to each applicant based on the high school
grades, ACT or SAT scores, relationship to alumni, special talents, leadership
qualities, geography, curriculum strength, and other factors.4 One such other
factor, in order to promote diversity, was "underrepresented minority status."5 In
an opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and representing the votes
of six of nine Justices, that admissions process was declared unconstitutional.6
In the other case, Grutter v. Bollinger,7 the Court reviewed the admissions
policies for the University of Michigan Law School. The school's policy involved
* With apologies to Johnny Mercer.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., Columbia University
(1968).
1. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. Id. at 316.
3. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
4. Id. at 2418-19.
5. Id. at 2419.
6. Id. at 2416.
7. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
1
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review of standardized test scores, college grades, and "all the information
available in the file," including activities, background, family contacts, a personal
statement, recommender's enthusiasm, and diversity.8 The Law School, unlike the
undergraduate school, did not add points for "underrepresented minority status,"
but rather considered diversity as just one factor, among many, that may or may
not be determinative. 9 The Michigan Law School admissions process, in a five-to-
four decision written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, was found to be
constitutional.10
In both cases, a majority of the Court stated that the Equal Protection
Clause barred any type of discrimination by race, unless (1) there was a
compelling governmental interest justifying the discrimination, and (2) the
program was designed or "tailored" as narrowly as possible to achieve its goals. 1
A diverse student body may be considered, as it was in Bakke, such an interest. 2
In the undergraduate case, the policy of adding points was not "narrowly
tailored" so as to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause." The additional points
afforded minority applicants meant that race was "decisive," almost guaranteeing
admission. 4 This procedure does not involve "individualized consideration";
rather it provides specific bonuses based on race.'5 Thus, the Court found it
unconstitutional because other policies could be adopted to promote diversity. 6
In the law school case, the more amorphous diversity program was narrowly
tailored to have as just one factor among others, promotion of diversity.' 7 This
was done by individualized review of all applications, and not by using any set of
18
specific criteria. As a result, the Court found the program constitutionally
permissible.
In this article, I will review the history that led to these decisions and the
difficult policy issues that the opinions address. I will then discuss the niceties of
the new two-tier analysis and its application to diversity programs generally.
I. FROM DRED SCOTT TO BAKKE
It is important to put the issue of affirmative action in its historical context.
We should not forget that until the Civil War and then the Civil War Amendments
(the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments), African-Americans
were not considered "persons." In fact, in Scott v. Sandford,'9 the United States
8. Id. at 2331-32.
9. See id. at 2334 (noting the testimony of Dean Jeffrey Lehman that sometimes "an applicant's
race may play no role, while in others it may be a determinative factor" (internal quotations omitted)).
10. Id. at 2330.
11. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
12. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2426-27; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
13. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2430.
14. Id. at 2428.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 2427-30.
17. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2342.
18. Id. at 2343.
19. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
[Vol. 39:27
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Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taney,20 stated that "Negroes,"
whether slaves or freedmen, were neither citizens nor persons under the American
Constitution.2' Neither Congress nor the States could make them citizens of our
society.22
After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. It provided
that all citizens, without regard to race, were to obtain "equal protection of the
laws" and all the same "privileges and immunities." ' This soon became a mere
hope and not, of course, a reality. Segregation took the place of slavery as a way
to limit the rights of minorities, particularly African-Americans. 24
20. Only two Justices dissented. Id. at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 564 (Curtis, J.,
dissenting).
21. Justice Taney stated on behalf of the Supreme Court:
The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and mean
the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the Government
through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the "sovereign people," and
every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The
question before us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement
[Negroes] compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this
sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended
to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none
of the rights and privileges.... On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race,
and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights
or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to
grant them.
Id. at 404-05.
22. The Court further stated:
[T]he personal rights and privileges guarantied to citizens of this new sovereignty were
intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several State communities,
or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise become members, according to the
provisions of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded....
It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were citizens of the several States when
the Constitution was adopted....
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used
in the Declaration of Independence, show, that neither the class of persons who had been
imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then
acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general words used
in that memorable instrument.
Id. at 406-07. The Court continued:
And if the Constitution recognises the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes
no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen,
no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative,
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the
provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property
against the encroachments of the Government.
Scott, 60 U.S. at 451.
23. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
24. See generally Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and
Black America's Struggle for Equality (Alfred A. Knopf 1976).
3
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A frontal attack on segregation was made at the end of the nineteenth
century in Plessy v. Ferguson.25 It was unsuccessful. In an opinion by Justice
Brown, with only a single dissent, 6 the Supreme Court held that it was not the
business of government to enforce social or societal equality.
27
Segregation was acceptable public policy. Discrimination based on race was
not only practiced but also legal and enforced in the courts. It took nearly sixty
25. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
26. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Brewer did not hear the argument or participate in the
decision. Id. at 564.
27. The Supreme Court stated:
The object of the [Civil Rights Amendments were] undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from
political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.
Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and
have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state
legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is
connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which
has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where
the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced....
Id. at 544. The Court further stated:
If the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural
affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of
individuals .... When the government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal
rights before the law and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has
accomplished the end for which it was organized and performed all of the functions
respecting social advantages with which it is endowed." Legislation is powerless to eradicate
racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to
do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and
political rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically.
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put
them upon the same plane.
Id. at 551-52 (quoting People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)).
28. As described by Justice Marshall in his opinion in Bakke:
In the wake of Plessy, many States expanded their Jim Crow laws, which had up until that
time been limited primarily to passenger trains and schools. The segregation of the races
was extended to residential areas, parks, hospitals, theaters, waiting rooms, and bathrooms.
There were even statutes and ordinances which authorized separate phone booths for
Negroes and whites, which required that textbooks used by children of one race be kept
separate from those used by the other, and which required that Negro and white prostitutes
be kept in separate districts. In 1898, after Plessy, the Charlestown News and Courier
printed a parody of Jim Crow laws:
"'If there must be Jim Crow cars on the railroads, there should be Jim Crow cars on the
street railways. Also on all passenger boats.... If there are to be Jim Crow cars,
moreover, there should be Jim Crow waiting saloons at all stations, and Jim Crow
eating houses.... There should be Jim Crow sections of the jury box, and a separate
Jim Crow dock and witness stand in every court-and a Jim Crow Bible for colored
witnesses to kiss."'
The irony is that before many years had passed, with the exception of the Jim Crow witness
stand, "all the improbable applications of the principle suggested by the editor in derision
had been put into practice-down to and including the Jim Crow Bible."
Nor were the laws restricting the rights of Negroes limited solely to the Southern States. In
many of the Northern States, the Negro was denied the right to vote, prevented from serving
on juries, and excluded from theaters, restaurants, hotels, and inns. Under President Wilson,
4
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years for the United States Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka," to admit it had been wrong and to hold that state sanctioned
discrimination was unconstitutional.30 It took an additional decade for Congress
to pass legislation saying that discrimination in all public accommodations was
also prohibited.31
With the rejection of the separate but equal doctrine, the question of how
American law and society would address hundreds of years of slavery and then
nearly a hundred more years of segregation was brought to the forefront of
debate. Responding to this call, the Supreme Court authorized experimentation
with numerous policies so long as the actions were taken with "all deliberate
speed. ' 32
the Federal Government began to require segregation in Government buildings; desks of
Negro employees were curtained off; separate bathrooms and separate tables in the
cafeterias were provided; and even the galleries of the Congress were segregated. When his
segregationist policies were attacked, President Wilson responded that segregation was "'not
humiliating but a benefit"' and that he was "'rendering [the Negroes] more safe in their
possession of office and less likely to be discriminated against."'
The enforced segregation of the races continued into the middle of the 20th century. In
both World Wars, Negroes were for the most part confined to separate military units; it was
not until 1948 that an end to segregation in the military was ordered by President Truman.
And the history of the exclusion of Negro children from white public schools is too well
known and recent to require repeating here. That Negroes were deliberately excluded from
public graduate and professional schools-and thereby denied the opportunity to become
doctors, lawyers, engineers, and the like-is also well established. It is of course true that
some of the Jim Crow laws (which the decisions of this Court had helped to foster) were
struck down by this Court in a series of decisions leading up to Brown v. Board of
Education.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 393-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown I").
30. The unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Warren stated:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has
no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the
plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 495.
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (1964). See Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding the validity of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Alabama based
upon the Commerce Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) ("Brown H"). In Brown I the Court
stated:
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied local
school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of
school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional
principles....
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable
principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping
its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These
cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power ....
While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that
the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17,
1954, ruling....
5
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In education, the Supreme Court indicated that to eliminate all vestiges of
state-imposed segregation, courts and school districts may adopt quotas or assign
students to schools based on race.33 In other areas, Congress, state legislatures,
and private entities authorized race-based quotas for hiring or race-based goals
and timetables for contracts.34
And then came Bakke. The Court from this case forward would separate
court-ordered mandates that may include quotas, set-asides, or explicit race-based
goals, from voluntary efforts.35
In Bakke, however, a five-Justice "majority" held that a University of
California special race-based admissions policy to its medical school was
unconstitutional.36 The Justices noted that the program was not a court-mandated
policy, but rather a voluntary effort. If, though, it had been found to be a
The judgments below.., are accordingly reversed and the cases are remanded to the
District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with
this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.
Id. at 299-301.
33. See Bernard Schwartz, Behind Bakke: Affirmative Action and the Supreme Court 31 (N.Y.U.
Press 1988). Schwartz discusses the Supreme Court decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, in which the Court considered what actions school authorities may take to integrate
schools and wherein the Court stated:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement
educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to
live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole.
402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
34. See e.g. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (1977); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979). As described by Justice Marshall in Bakke:
After the Civil War our Government started several "affirmative action" programs. This
Court in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement toward
complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken, and this nonaction was with
the tacit approval of the courts. Then we had Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil
Rights Acts of Congress, followed by numerous affirmative-action programs.
438 U.S. at 402 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. The Court stated, "We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as
members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of
judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Bakke, 438
U.S. at 307.
36. 438 U.S. at 271-72. Justice Powell stated on behalf of the Court:
For the reasons stated in the following opinion, I believe that so much of the judgment of
the California court as holds petitioner's special admissions program unlawful and directs
that respondent be admitted to the Medical School must be affirmed. For the reasons
expressed in a separate opinion, my Brothers THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART,
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS concur in this judgment.
I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion that the portion of the
court's judgment enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its
admissions process must be reversed. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my
Brothers MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concur in this judgment.
[Vol. 39:27
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"neutral" policy that would allow race to be one factor among many, the program
would be constitutional.37
The background to this decision is fascinating and described in depth by
Professor Bernard Schwartz in Behind Bakke.3 8
In a deeply divided decision, four of the Justices believed that the University
of California's program was permissible, while four others disagreed.39 Of the four
Justices who believed the program was in full compliance with the Equal
Protection Clause, Justice Marshall was the most adamant:
For it must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the Constitution
as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms
of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a State acts to remedy the effects of
that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a
barrier.
40
37. Id. at 316-19.
38. See Schwartz, supra n. 33. The book, using documentary and oral sources, traces the method by
which the Justices reached their decision in this "cause cl~bre." Id. at ix-x, 1.
39. Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[n]o person ... shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subject to discrimination .... in any program that receives federal funding. 28 U.S.C. § 2000d. It was
assumed that this section proscribed the same racial classifications as the Equal Protection Clause.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287.
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Later, Justice Marshall concluded:
While I applaud the judgment of the Court that a university may consider race in its
admissions process, it is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-
based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based
remedy for that discrimination is permissible. In declining to so hold, today's judgment
ignores the fact that for several hundred years Negroes have been discriminated against, not
as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. It is unnecessary in 20th-
century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of
racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of
wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes in
America has been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is
not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior
by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot has
not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even made it into the pot.
These differences in the experience of the Negro make it difficult for me to accept that
Negroes cannot be afforded greater protection under the Fourteenth Amendment where it is
necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination....
Most importantly, had the Court been willing in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, to hold that
the Equal Protection Clause forbids differences in treatment based on race, we would not be
faced with this dilemma in 1978. We must remember, however, that the principle that the
"Constitution is color-blind" appeared only in the opinion of the lone dissenter. The
majority of the Court rejected the principle of color blindness, and for the next 60 years,
from Plessy to Brown v. Board of Education, ours was a Nation where, by law, an individual
could be given "special" treatment based on the color of his skin.
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now must permit the institutions of
this society to give consideration to race in making decisions about who will hold the
positions of influence, affluence, and prestige in America. For far too long, the doors to
those positions have been shut to Negroes. If we are ever to become a fully integrated
society, one in which the color of a person's skin will not determine the opportunities
available to him or her, we must be willing to take steps to open those doors. I do not
believe that anyone can truly look into America's past and still find that a remedy for the
effects of that past is impermissible.
2003]
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Four other Justices believed that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 barred
discrimination based on race and, because of the statutory solution, they declined
to answer the constitutional question.
One Justice-Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.42  made up a majority by taking
an "in-between" position. At one point in his deliberations, Justice Powell had
rejected any type of affirmative action program as being an "explicit" and invalid
race-based program.43 He reaffirmed this in his opinion: "The special admissions
program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background., 44 As
such, the classification had to be reviewed under a "strict scrutiny" standard.45
But by the time of the Justices' conference on the decision, Justice Powell
was moving towards some compromise, one in favor of diversity.46 He asserted
that societal discrimination is not a substantial or compelling government interest
capable of withstanding strict scrutiny. However, the attainment of a diverse
student body may be.47
Still, the "colossal blunder [in this case] was to pick a [specific] number., 48
The University of California had a special committee to review "Minority Group"
candidates, and the admission criteria were lower for these students. 49 The special
admissions program was "designed to assure the admission of a specified number
of students from certain minority groups.,
50
The method used to reach this goal, Powell states in his opinion, must be
"necessary to promote this interest."'" Powell suggests that a program that uses
race as simply a "plus" factor when considered with other factors may be a
method narrow enough to satisfy strict scrutiny.52
The "holding," of course, was that the California system was invalid. Bakke
had to be admitted. The remainder of the decision was dictum-not necessary for
Id. at 400-02 (citation omitted).
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 411-12, 417-18 (Stevens, J., Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
42. On his retirement, Justice Powell indicated that his opinion in Bakke was his most important.
Schwartz, supra n. 33, at 1.
43. Id. at 85.
44. 438 U.S. at 289.
45. Id. at 291. Powell did not use this language in the decision. He did, however, use it in his
memoranda to the other Justices explaining his position. See Schwartz, supra n. 33, at 82-85.
46. See Schwartz, supra n. 33, at 96-97.
47. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
48. Schwartz, supra note 33, at 96 (quoting Justice Stevens) (internal quotation omitted). In
the opinion, Justice Powell noted that the California courts found that the program was a quota.
Specifically, he observed, "The court below found-and petitioner does not deny-that white
applicants could not compete for the 16 places reserved solely for the special admissions program.
Both courts below characterized this as a 'quota' system." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288-89 n. 26
(citation omitted).
49. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75.
50. Id. at 269-70.
51. Id. at 314-15.
52. Id. at 317-19.
[Vol. 39:27
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resolution of the case. But the dictum was important and stood as the controlling
constitutional law.53
II. BAKKETOADARAND
Despite the concerns raised in Bakke about any numerical set-asides, such
programs continued, both in education admissions and in private and public
contracting. Colleges and universities interpreted the case as a "license, not [a]
prohibit[ion of] race-conscious admissions programs., 54 Minor distinctions were
made to comply with the literal language used by Justice Powell, but "[t]he bottom
line [was] that Bakke... meant anything but the end of special admissions
programs. On the contrary, the post-Bakke situation [was], practically speaking,
not very different from what it was before the Supreme Court decision.,
55
The impact of Bakke upon situations other than higher education was even
less. Private employers saw the case as making special preference for minorities
still acceptable. Quotas were acceptable and encouraged or even mandated by
federal policy in appropriate circumstances where there was past discrimination.56
The limited interpretation of Bakke to higher education was supported by
Supreme Court decisions. Numerical mandates for new trainees in industries
where minority representation had been historically low, said the Court, were
acceptable.57 Fixed goals and numbers for hiring and promotion of minorities
were allowed where there could be shown a historical policy of discrimination.58
In addition, federal Minority Based Enterprise (MBE) programs mandated
specific percentages (ten percent) of minority participation, to remedy past
discrimination. Again, the Court found these programs constitutional.5 9
In 1989, the Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.60 entered a new
phase in its affirmative action jurisprudence. 6' A minority set-aside, similar to the
federal set-aside, was adopted by the City of Richmond, Virginia. The purpose
53. See Schwartz, supra n. 33, at 152.
54. Id. at 154.
55. Id. at 156.
56. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court and the Search for Equal Justice, in The
Rehnquist Court: A Retrospective 44, 45-47 (Martin H. Belsky ed., Oxford U. Press 2002) (calling this
the "first phase" of the Supreme Court's "modern race jurisprudence" which accepts race-based
solutions "through the use of numerical racial benchmarks").
57. See e.g. United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 193 (upholding an employer's affirmative action plan
which mandated that half of all individuals in a training program be black).
58. See Loc. No. 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Loc. 28
Sheet Metal Workers Intl. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
59. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding the set-aside in the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977 as applied to the construction industry).
60. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
61. See Wilkinson, supra n. 56, at 48.
62. The Court described the set-aside plan in Croson as follows:
The Plan required prime contractors to whom the city awarded construction contracts to
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was to overcome historic discrimination in the construction industry. Justice
O'Connor wrote the opinion 63 and established the new affirmative action agenda,
which she later applied in the Michigan cases:
1. The Richmond set-aside was bad.
2. Based on Bakke, any classification, such as a minority set-aside or
benign or remedial quota, based on race-whether to benefit a majority
or minority-had to be reviewed by a strict scrutiny test, and therefore,
the classification must be justified by a compelling state interest and
narrowly tailored to achieve those ends.'
3. The compelling state interest must be based on at least "an articulated
factual basis" for a racial classification and a clear "nexus" between the
scope of relief and factual basis."
a. Societal discrimination or even nationwide discrimination in an
industry, like the construction industry, is not enough.'
b. A "race-conscious" remedy would only be allowed when there are
"wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination."'67
c. Thus, a compelling interest for race-conscious remedy must be
based on "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations."'
The Plan defined an MBE as "[a] business at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is owned
and controlled.., by minority group members." "Minority group members" were defined
as "[clitizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts."
488 U.S. at 477-78 (quoting Richmond City Code (Va.) § 12-23, 941 (1985)).
63. Justice O'Connor's opinion is divided into sections. See id. at 476-511. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice White joined in the whole opinion. Id. at 476. Justice Scalia concurred but would have
gone further and never allow states or local governments to have "race-conscious" classifications
(which he calls discrimination) to ameliorate past discrimination. Id. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy concurred, accepting that all the basic premises of the O'Connor opinion would allow
states or local governments to remedy demonstrated past discrimination. Id. at 518-520 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens only concurred on the basis that
this ordinance was not narrowly tailored. He would allow "race-conscious" classifications for societal
discrimination-not just as remedy for specific past wrongs-if there were specific findings of
discrimination. This finding would preferably be made by courts, and the availability of remedy
limited to only those who were the real victims, not to non-affected minorities or from other areas.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 511-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Totaling this up, five Justices fully supported Justice O'Connor's conclusion or would have gone
further. One Justice focused on the issue of "narrow tailoring." Three Justices, Marshall, Brennan and
Blackmun, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, would not have applied the "compelling government
interest" or the "narrow tailoring" standards. Rather, they would allow "remedial" legislation to
"serve important governmental objectives" and require that it be "substantially related to achievement
of those objectives." Societal discrimination might be enough as proof should be practical and not
rigid. Id. at 535 (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
64. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. See id. at 494-95.
66. See id. at 499.
67. Id. at 496-97 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307) (internal quotations omitted).
68. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307) (internal quotations omitted).
[Vol. 39:27
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss1/3
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
4. Even if a compelling interest is shown, the remedy must be "narrowly
tailored" to the specific case."
a. Here, the scope was too broad-including groups with no showing
of prior discrimination against them.79
b. There must be a "waiver" procedure that is broad enough to cover
exigencies. Here, the waiver was too narrow and based solely on
the availability of Minority Business Enterprises and not on the
number of individuals with qualifications who were able and
willing.'
c. Other alternatives to a fixed quota must be considered-such as
"race-neutral" programs supporting smaller businesses.72
5. A ban on quotas does not mean that individuals who have been
discriminated against do not have a remedy. But this must be done
through an "individualized procedure" for specific cases to determine if
the program is discriminatory. The administrative convenience of a set-
aside is not sufficient justification for a quota.73
Even with Croson's detailed test, the question of whether the federal
government could enact laws that impose specific quotas on companies using
federal funds, participating in federal programs, or engaging in business with the
government was left open. At first, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,7 4 the
Court, by a bare five-to-four majority, upheld minority preference programs
enacted by the federal government. Five years later, the Court changed its mind,
in another opinion written by Justice O'Connor.75
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held that the standard for
reviewing government programs was the same whether it was a local, a state, or
the federal government. The detailed test established in Croson for state and local
governments must be congruent with those applied to the federal government.7 6
However, Justice O'Connor urged, reviewing programs by a strict scrutiny,
narrowly tailored test does not mean that all such programs are bad:
69. See id. at 507-08.
70. Id. at 506. (finding that "[tlhere [was] absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against
Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or Aleut persons," at] of whom were included in the list of
minorities to be included in the set-aside).
71. Id. at 508.
72. See id. at 507.
73. Croson, 488 U.S. at 508.
74. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
75. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). The decision was a five-to-four
decision. The dissenting justices, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, would have allowed a
test of less than strict scrutiny, like the dissent in Croson. See generally id. at 242-64 (Stevens &
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); id. at 264-71 (Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 271-76
(Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia would have gone further than Justice O'Connor by
stating that there could never be a "compelling interest" to justify racial discrimination. Id. at 239
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
76. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 235.
2003]
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Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact." The unhappy persistence of both the practice and
the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this
country is an unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it.... When race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it
satisfies the "narrow tailoring" test this Court has set out in previous cases.
77
III. LEADING UP TO GRUTTER AND GRATZ
It was assumed by most commentators that Croson and Adarand meant both
the end of racial preferences 78 and perhaps an implicit overruling of Bakke.
79
Then, in Hopwood v. Texas,80 a panel of Fifth Circuit judges seemed to confirm
this belief that the era of racial preferences had ended. In that case, the Fifth
Circuit was asked to review an affirmative action plan that applied "disparate
standards" and a separate evaluation track for blacks and Mexican-Americans "to
meet an 'aspiration' of admitting a class consisting of 10% Mexican Americans
and 5% blacks, proportions roughly comparable to the percentages of those races
graduating from Texas colleges.
8 1
The application of different standards and set percentages in the program
clearly violated the "taking into account" standard set out in Bakke. While the
trial court found the program unacceptable, it indicated that a revised procedure,
which used race as just one factor among others, would be acceptable. 82 The court
of appeals went further, however, and stated that Bakke was no longer good law:
We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the
law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell's argument in Bakke
garnered only his own vote and has never represented the view of a majority of the
Court in Bakke or any other case. Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
regarding education state that non-remedial state interests will never justify racial
classifications. Finally, the classification of persons on the basis of race for the
purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection.
Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue. While he
announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the opinion
83discussing the diversity rationale .
77. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., concurring)).
78. Judge Wilkinson calls this the "nondiscrimination principal." Wilkinson, supra n. 56, at 48.
79. See Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a Conservative Supreme Court, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy
281, 289 (2003).
80. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
81. Id. at 937.
82. Id. at 946.
83. Id. at 944. The Court continued:
Thus, only one Justice concluded that race could be used solely for the reason of obtaining
a heterogenous student body. As the Adarand Court states, the Bakke Court did not
express a majority view and is questionable as binding precedent.
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The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in Hopwood, primarily for
procedural reasons. 4 For six years, the debate mounted. Many people were torn
over the obvious conflict-fairness vs. fairness.
On the one hand, it was argued, there is a tragic history of quotas in higher
85
education, especially against minority groups such as Jews and blacks. Any
affirmative action plan, whether titled quotas, targets, or even the seemingly
neutral "goals and timetables," must be opposed in principal. s6 Moreover, such
plans must also be opposed because in operation, they discriminate against Jews
and other ethnic minorities. It is not the traditionally favored who will lose their
placement-the establishment will make sure of that.87
Some affirmative action opponents made the historical argument. They
argued that other minority groups have been successful despite overt
discrimination and without the aid of affirmative action programs. 88 And, if those
groups were successful, why couldn't others be? Moreover, maybe there was
overt discrimination in the past, but that time is gone and now all that is needed is
Since Bakke, the Court has accepted the diversity rationale only once in its cases dealing
with race. Significantly, however, in that case, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, the five-Justice majority relied upon an intermediate scrutiny
standard of review to uphold the federal program seeking diversity in the ownership of
broadcasting facilities. In Adarand, the Court squarely rejected intermediate scrutiny as the
standard of review for racial classifications, and Metro Broadcasting is now specifically
overruled to the extent that it was in conflict with this holding. No case since Bakke has
accepted diversity as a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny analysis.
Indeed, recent Supreme Court precedent shows that the diversity interest will not satisfy
strict scrutiny. Foremost, the Court appears to have decided that there is essentially only
one compelling state interest to justify racial classifications: remedying past wrongs.
In short, there has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than Justice Powell's
lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling
justification for governmental race-based discrimination. Subsequent Supreme Court
caselaw strongly suggests, in fact, that it is not.
Id. at 944-45 (citations omitted).
84. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter, indicated the reasons for denial of the petition:
Whether it is constitutional for a public college or graduate school to use race or national
origin as a factor in its admissions process is an issue of great national importance. The
petition before us, however, does not challenge the lower courts' judgments that the
particular admissions procedure used by the University of Texas Law School in 1992 was
unconstitutional. Acknowledging that the 1992 admissions program "has long since been
discontinued and will not be reinstated," Pet. for Cert. 28, the petitioners do not defend that
program in this Court. Instead, petitioners challenge the rationale relied on by the Court of
Appeals. "[Tihis Court," however, "reviews judgments, not opinions." Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694
(1984) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we must await a final judgment on a program
genuinely in controversy before addressing the important question raised in this petition.
Tex. v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033,1033 (1996) (citations to Reply Brief and Brief of Amicus Curiae
of United States omitted).
85. Alan M. Dershowitz, Chutzpah 78 (Little, Brown & Co. 1991); James D. Besser, Big Relief on
Race Cases, Jewish Week 28 (June 27, 2003).
86. Dershowitz, supra n. 85, at 76-77.
87. See id. at 75.
88. Id. at 77.
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a "level playing field." This is a "New America," more diverse and without the
historic powerful elite and powerless racial minorities. 9
Finally, there was the moral argument against affirmative action plans. To
allow racial preferences, they argued, is to "stamp" those given this preference
with a "badge of inferiority. ' '90
On the other hand, the argument in favor of affirmative action programs also
talked about the real world. In the real world, discrimination based on race still
exists.9' In the real world, diversity is still essential to overcome the ill effects of
past discrimination and to assure eventual equality. Diversity is also necessary,
especially in an academic setting, to allow the communication of other
perspectives and "for people to learn that all members of the same minority
seldom share the same viewpoints. 9 2  Efforts to promote diversity should. be
encouraged, not opposed. 93
In the real world, the argument continued, no one is demanding quotas any
longer. Rather, all that colleges and universities want is to consider an applicant's
race as one factor among many that can be taken into account. Right now, college
administrators can "take into account" ability to pay; financial support for the
university (donations by parents); legacy (alumni parents or siblings); special skills
like music, theater, and athletics; and even political support. Why not allow race
as just one additional factor to encourage diversity in the student body and
faculty?
94
The pro-affirmative action argument further asserted that this is not just a
question of equal opportunity. Stereotypes about differences between people are
more likely to lessen when people get to know each other as associates. 95
Academically, in a classroom, someone who is Asian, African-American, Jewish,
Muslim, or Christian, can bring differing perspectives to everything from history
and culture to even science and math.96
89. Wilkinson, supra n. 56, at 57-59.
90. See Scott Douglas Gerber, First Principles: The Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas 101-02
(N.Y.U. Press 1999) (quoting Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)).
91. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-27 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see Julius L. Chambers, Race and Equality: The Still
Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, in The Warren Court: A Retrospective 21, 38 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., Oxford U. Press 1996).
92. Pros and Cons of Affirmative Action, 46 Law Quadrangle Notes 38 (Spring 2003) (quoting Prof.
Richard Primus).
93. M. Lee Pelton, This Issue Has a Human Face, in Tim Foley, In Reactions to the Michigan
Rulings, Diversity Abounds, Chron. Higher Educ. B10, B10-11 (July 4, 2003). Justice Stevens, who
supported the majority decision in Croson, noted that he "would not totally discount the legitimacy of
race-based decisions that may produce tangible and fully justified future benefits." Croson, 488 U.S. at
511 n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
94. This was, in fact, the argument accepted by Justice O'Connor in Grutter. 123 S. Ct. at 2334. See
Vikram David Amar, Equal Protection: Racial Minorities in the 2002 Term, in Preview of United States
Supreme Court Cases 475, 480 (ABA 2003).
95. Nancy E. Cantor, A Victory for Justice, and a Vindication, in Tim Foley, In Reactions to the
Michigan Rulings, Diversity Abounds, Chron. Higher Educ. B10, B12 (July 4, 2003).
96. Any teacher can tell you that varied experiences enrich the classroom. I have experienced this
myself in teaching law courses. A discussion of the constitutionality of abortion restrictions is better
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The debate between opponents and advocates of affirmative action
programs heightened when the Supreme Court agreed to hear two cases from
Michigan-one involving a law school minority admissions policy97 and one
involving an undergraduate minority admissions program.9 The cases were taken
at the same time "so that [the] Court could address the constitutionality of the
consideration of race in university admissions in a wider range of circumstances. '" 99
• • 100
The specific focus was on reconciling conflicting decisions, including Hopwood.
IV. GRATZ V. BOLLINGER AND GRUTTER V. BOLLINGER
As indicated earlier, Bakke dealt with voluntary efforts by a university to
provide for diversity, 1' while both Croson and Adarand dealt with legislative and
executive efforts to mandate diversity.0 2 Neither these cases nor the Michigan
cases of 2003 dealt with goals and timetables, set-asides, or quotas mandated by a
court after findings of past discrimination. Such actions are part of the courts'
inherent remedial powers to deal with the effects of segrega'tion.0 3
The Court's focus in the two Michigan decisions was the two-part "strict
scrutiny" test for reviewing racially based governmental actions under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment' 4 To satisfy this test, there
must first be a "compelling state interest," and, second, even if such an interest is
found, the government entity must employ only "narrowly tailored measures.'1
0 5
The Court was heavily influenced in these decisions by the briefs of
numerous amici.'O° These briefs came from a broad array of groups, including
when there are both men and women in the classroom. Perspectives on the meaning of equal
protection of the laws-and, yes, affirmative action-are enriched when there are people of color in
the classroom. A discussion of the separation of church and state is much more interesting when
Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and atheists can state their personal experiences. I have been told by English
professors that diversity in the student body helps class discussion and analysis of everything from
Robert Frost poetry and Shakespearean plays to Ellison's "The Invisible Man" and Malamud's "The
Assistant." See Ronald Dworkin, The Court and University, 50 N.Y. Rev. of Bks. 8 (May 15, 2003).
97. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325.
98. See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. 2411.
99. Id. at 2422.
100. The Court stated in Grutter:
We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a
question of national importance: Whether diversity is a compelling interest that can justify
the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting applicants for admission to public universities.
Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (CA5 1996) (Hopwood I) (holding that diversity is
not a compelling state interest), with Smith v. University of Wash. Law School, 233 F.3d 1188
(CA9 2000) (holding that it is).
123 S. Ct. at 2335 (citation of grant of certiorari omitted).
101. See text accompanying supra n. 35.
102. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 469.
103. See e.g. U.S. v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 742-43 (1992); U.S. v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183-84
(1987).
104. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
105. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2427; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-38.
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American businesses and the military,0 7 who supported the position that diversity
was essential to a flourishing economy and military. 0
Relying on Bakke,'0 9 Justice O'Connor in Grutter wrote for a five-Justice
majority that "obtaining 'the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student
body"' 10 is such a compelling reason. Justice O'Connor rejected the idea that
cases post-Bakke had implicitly overruled Bakke on this issue.' Rather, the
Court accepted the informed and complex judgments of education officials that
"diversity is essential to its educational mission.... ,,1 Chief Justice Rehnquist
accepted this as a given in his decision in Gratz."3
How a program was to be designed to meet the "compelling interest" of
diversity became the Court's focus of review. As a practical matter, the key
107. Dworkin, supra n. 96.
108. The Supreme Court stated in Grutter:
These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear
that the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more,
high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that,
"[biased on [their] decades of experience," a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national
security." The primary sources for the Nation's officer corps are the service academies and
the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students already
admitted to participating colleges and universities. At present, "the military cannot achieve
an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies
and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies." To fulfill its
mission, the military "must be selective in admissions for training and education for the
officer corps, and it must train and educate a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in
a racially diverse setting." We agree that "[I]t requires only a small step from this analysis to
conclude that our country's other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and
selective."
Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a
large number of our Nation's leaders. Sweat Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly
half the state governorships, more than half the seats in the United States Senate, and more
than a third of the seats in the United States House of Representatives....
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is
necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity....
The Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a "critical
mass" of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in
securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.
123 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (quoting Br. of Amicus Curiae Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. at 27).
109. See Amar, supra n. 94, at 479 (noting that Justice O'Connor quoted Bakke a "whopping 16
times").
110. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-39 (quoting Br. of Respt. Bollinger et al. at i).
111. Id. at 2339.
112. Id.
113. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
Petitioners further argue that "diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is simply
too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of
supporting narrowly-tailored means." But for the reasons set forth today in Grutter v.
Bollinger, the Court has rejected these arguments of petitioners.
Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2426-27 (quoting Br. of Petr. at 17).
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decisions were those of Justices O'Connor and Breyer. l l4  While Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas felt that both the Michigan
Law School and undergraduate admissions programs were in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause,"5 Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg felt that both
of the programs were constitutional.116
The terms used by Justice O'Connor in Grutter to describe the review
process illustrates the split Court's insistence that the "means chosen" must be
"specifically and narrowly framed" to "accomplish" the government's "asserted
purpose.. 1 7  The terms must be almost architectural in nature: "defin[ing] the
contours" and "calibrat[ing]" the "inquiry" to make sure that the remedy would
"fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body
diversity.. ,,'8
Certain things are clear-there can be no quota system. 9  "Instead, a
university may consider race ... only as a plus in a particular applicant's
file.... ,120 The Michigan Law School's plan of taking race into account as one of
many factors in an attempt to establish a "critical mass" of minorities satisfies this
narrow tailoring.1 21 For now, Justice O'Connor will accept the Law School's word
that it is moving towards a "race-neutral admissions formula," 122 and reject the




115. See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2417; id. at 2443 (Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2348
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2350 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Kennedy & Thomas. JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 2370 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Rehnquist reviews the defense of the law school administrators that it seeks only
to obtain a "critical mass" and attempts to use statistical tables to show that "[t]he tight correlation
between the percentage of applicants and admittees of a given race, therefore, must result from careful
race based planning by the Law School." Id. at 2369 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Thomas & Kennedy, JJ.,
dissenting).
Justice Scalia rejects the idea that diversity is a compelling interest, that there is any legitimate
benefit to "teach[ing] good citizenship... through a patriotic, all-American system of racial
discrimination .... Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
Justice Kennedy similarly uses statistics to argue that there really was not individualized review
in the law school admission process as allowed by "taking into account" language in Bakke, but rather
that racial balancing occurred. Id. at 2372-73.
116. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2440 (Souter &Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2445 (Ginsburg & Souter, JJ.,
dissenting); Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
117. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)) (internal quotations
omitted).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2342 ("To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota
system....").
120. Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (internal quotations omitted).
121. See id.
122. Gruter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (quoting Br. for Respt. Bollinger 34) (internal quotations omitted).
123. Id. at 2343. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy take the position that the
policy is a pretense. Id. at 2365 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, Thomas & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting); id. at
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The undergraduate admissions plan, used to consider applicants to the
College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, does not pass constitutional scrutiny.
Unlike the Law School's consideration of race, Justice O'Connor states, the focus
of the undergraduate admissions process is not on "individualized review" but
rather uses numerical values-points-which turns the process into one that is
invalid. 1
4
V. DIFFERENCE IN PERSPECTIVE
That great legal philosopher Yogi Berra has noted, "Where you stand
depends on where you sit." In the various opinions in Grutter and Gratz, three
very different visions of the present state of racism are depicted.
Justice Thomas believes that although racism continues to exist, affirmative
action programs stamp minority students with a "badge of inferiority," a stigma
that follows them throughout their life.125 It engenders resentment against them
and even leads to questions of competence, just at a time when they are taking
"positions in the highest places of government, industry, or academia."'' 26
Justice O'Connor takes an "in-between" position. The "core purpose" of the
Equal Protection Clause "was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race. 1 2' 7 Great progress has been achieved in the twenty-
five years since Bakke. It is appropriate for schools to "terminate... race-
conscious admissions... as soon as practicable. ' 28
Still, Justice O'Connor believes that it is not yet time to mandate an end to
all race-conscious admissions. Some time limit must be set. According to Justice
O'Connor, setting such a "termination point 'assure[s] all citizens that the
deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a
temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself."",
129
She sets a goal of twenty-five years from 2003 as the termination point.3 °
124. See Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2431-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Breyer agrees with Justice
O'Connor's reasoning but also accepts the idea, expressed by Justice Ginsburg, that a racially based
policy of "inclusion" may be appropriate and constitutional in some cases. Careful judicial inspection
is necessary but not so intensive as to exclude all reasonable efforts to overcome past racial oppression.
Id. at 2433-34 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 2443-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2362 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2346 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)) (internal quotations omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510). Justice O'Connor also quotes:
It would be a sad day indeed, were America to become a quota-ridden society, with each
identifiable minority assigned proportional representation in every desirable walk of life.
But that is not the rationale for programs of preferential treatment; the acid test of their
justification will be their efficacy in eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic preferences
at all.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346 (quoting Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik, The Constitutionality
of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 Chi. Bar Rec. 282, 293
(May-June 1977)) (internal quotations omitted).
130. Justice O'Connor stated in her opinion:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an interest
in student body diversity in the context of public higher education. Since that time, the
[Vol. 39:27
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Justice Ginsburg gives a more pessimistic history lesson. It has been only
fifty years since public school segregation was declared unconstitutional, and that
was followed by years of "prolonged resistance. '1 31 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg
states, "It is well documented that conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land... 13 2  Schools are still
segregated by race, and black schools are still inferior to white ones.133
"Irrational" racial prejudice persists, she argues, not just in educational
access, but also in employment, health care, housing, and even day-to-day
consumer transactions. 34 It is at best a hope, but not really an expectation, that in
another twenty-five years "progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely
equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action." '135
VI. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
The Court in both Grutter and Gratz noted that the challenges to the
undergraduate and law admissions programs were based on not only the Equal
Protection Clause but also Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.136 That Act
prohibits discrimination based on race by any program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance. 3 7 Colleges and universities, of course, receive loans, grants,
and other federal support and thus, it would seem, come under this provision.
And looking back at previous precedents dealing with contracting and licensing,
number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today.
Id. at 2346-47.
131. Id. at 2347 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
132. Id.
133. Justice Ginsburg provides the following information in support of her argument:
As to public education, data for the years 2000-2001 show that 71.6% of African-American
children and 76.3% of Hispanic children attended a school in which minorities made up a
majority of the student body. And schools in predominantly minority communities lag far
behind others measured by the educational resources available to them.
Id. at 2348 (citations omitted).
134. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2443-44 (Ginsburg & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
135. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2348 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring) (footnote omitted). Justice
Thomas, who dissented in Grutter, saying the racially based policies are unconstitutional now as they
were in the past, did recognize that there may not be much change twenty-five years from now:
The majority does not and cannot rest its time limitation on any evidence that the gap in
credentials between black and white students is shrinking or will be gone in that time-frame.
In recent years there has been virtually no change, for example, in the proportion of law school
applicants with LSAT scores of 165 and higher who are black. In 1993 blacks constituted 1.1%
of law school applicants in that score range, though they represented 11.1% of all applicants.
In 2000 the comparable numbers were 1.0% and 11.3%. No one can seriously contend, and
the Court does not, that the racial gap in academic credentials will disappear in 25 years.
Id. at 2364 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations and
footnotes omitted).
136. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2418; Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
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these rules apply not just to educational institutions but also to a broad number of
businesses and industries that receive benefits from governments at any level. 38
So, what are the rules? Racial quotas are just not permissible unless done
pursuant to a court order. In fact, whether implemented by a private or public
entity, specific quotas based on race have been illegal since at least Bakke, which
applied both the Constitution and the 1964 Civil Rights Act.139 Quotas have been
upheld only when they are imposed by a court pursuant to findings that they are
the necessary remedy to end discrimination. 4 °
Under Gratz, which reaffirmed Bakke, specific goals with defined timetables,
preferences, or set-asides are also invalid if imposed by a government entity. They
are probably invalid, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to any private entity
taking government funds, like a private college or university,14 or receiving any
government financing, contract, or license.
The Supreme Court did not accept the idea of reverse or "negative
discrimination," often used to describe affirmative action programs based on
explicit goals and timetables and set-asides. Instead, it accepted or "accentuated"
the positive concept of promoting diversity by allowing it to be a compelling
interest justifying some selection based on race. The issue for the future will be
the "in-between.' 42
For most universities and colleges, the GrutterlGratz "in-between" will be
seen as a welcome relief from a set of attacks.143 Justice O'Connor indicated that
schools should move to other non-race-based alternatives, and that for a period of
up to twenty-five years, diversity based Grutter type programs would be
considered acceptable.'" The Grutter decision was, of course, only a five-to-four
138. See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200 (contracting); Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547
(licensing).
139. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287, 320.
140. See e.g. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717; Paradise, 480 U.S. at 183-85.
141. The Center for Equal Opportunity has already filed complaints and sent "warning letters" to
private colleges and universities challenging their minority admissions programs under Bakke and now
Gratz/Grutter. Pat Wingert & Debra Rosenberg, Just the Beginning, 142 Newsweek 10 (July 28, 2003).
142. See Peter Schmidt, Affirmative Action Survives, and So Does the Debate, Chron. of Higher
Educ. S1 (July 4, 2003).
143. Id. at S2.
144. Justice O'Connor stated in her opinion in Grutter:
We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement
that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point. The Law School, too,
concedes that all "race-conscious programs must have reasonable durational limits."
In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset
provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine whether
racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity. Universities in
California, Florida, and Washington State, where racial preferences in admissions are
prohibited by state law, are currently engaged in experimenting with a wide variety of
alternative approaches. Universities in other States can and should draw on the most
promising aspects of these race-neutral alternatives as they develop.
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an
interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education. Since that time,
the number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We
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"holding," and any change in the Court's composition could alter that
discretionary period quickly.1
45
Even with the decision, though, there are some real doubts by members of
the Court about the discretion to be given to administrators in the near future.
Justice Scalia warns that all these cases will do is "prolong the controversy and the
litigation., 146  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy question the
acceptance of university statistics. 14  Justice Thomas goes further and makes a
direct attack on granting this type of discretion to "university administrators."
Justice Thomas believes that the real defense of the University of Michigan's
affirmative action program is protection of its "elite status.' 48 There is "nothing
compelling" in helping a school maintain its elite status.149 The Court should not
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today.
123 S. Ct. at 2346-47 (quoting Br. of Respt. Bollinger et al. at 32) (citations omitted).
145. See The Supreme Court Approves Affirmative Action, 3 The Week 4 (July 11, 2003).
146. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and dissdnting in part).
Justice Scalia asserted:
Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational
institutions are impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial
preferences in state educational institutions are OK, today's Grutter-Gratz split double
header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation. Some future
lawsuits will presumably focus on whether the discriminatory scheme in question contains
enoigh evaluation of the applicant "as an individual," ante, at 2343, and sufficiently avoids
"separate admissions tracks" ante, at 2342, to fall under Grutter rather than Gratz. Some will
focus on whether a university has gone beyond the bounds of a "'good faith effort"' and has
so zealously pursued its "critical mass" as to make it an unconstitutional de facto quota
system, rather than merely "'a permissible goal."' Ante, at 2342 (quoting Sheet Metal
Workers' v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 495, 106 S.Ct. 3019, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986) (O'CONNOR,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Other lawsuits may focus on whether, in the
particular setting at issue, any educational benefits flow from racial diversity. (That issue
was not contested in Grutter; and while the opinion accords "a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions," ante, at 2339, "deference does not imply abandonment or
abdication of judicial review." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154
L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).) Still other suits may challenge the bona fides of the institution's
expressed commitment to the educational benefits of diversity that immunize the
discriminatory scheme in Grutter. (Tempting targets, one would suppose, will be those
universities that talk the talk of multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk
the walk of tribalism and racial segregation on their campuses-through minority-only
student organizations, separate minority housing opportunities, separate minority student
centers, even separate minority-only graduation ceremonies.) And still other suits may
claim that the institution's racial preferences have gone below or above the mystical Grutter-
approved "critical mass." Finally, litigation can be expected on behalf of minority groups
intentionally short changed in the institution's composition of its generic minority "critical
mass." I do not look forward to any of these cases. The Constitution proscribes government
discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no exception.
Id. at 2349-50.
147. See supra n. 115 and accompanying text.
148. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2353 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Id. at 2355. Later in his opinion, Justice Thomas states:
While these students [of elite schools] may graduate with law degrees, there is no evidence
that they have received a qualitatively better legal education (or become better lawyers)
than if they had gone to a less "elite" law school for which they were better prepared. And
the aestheticists will never address the real problems facing "underrepresented minorities,"
instead continuing their social experiments on other people's children.
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promote such stress on academic quality at the expense of racial equality. It is
unfair, and not just to white students. It sets up minority students for failure. 5°
The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a
University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers. These
overmatched students take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the
cauldron of competition. And this mismatch crisis is not restricted to elite
institutions.'
51
Justice Thomas asserts that there are race-neutral alternatives to increase the
number of minorities at Michigan, "such as accepting all students who meet
minimum qualifications .... '
But, for at least a while, such discretion will still be given to university
administrators. "Taking into account" affirmative action programs will continue,
and may even be reinstated in those places where there was some belief that they
were invalid.153 The desire and hope of these programs will be to use a case-by-
case review to increase percentages of under-represented minorities.
Opponents will try to demonstrate that these programs approach set-asides
or even quotas. 154 In her opinion upholding the program at the University of
Michigan Law School, Justice O'Connor suggested another tactic for opponents,
sunset provisions for such programs. 55 Thus, some will likely seek state-by-state
legislation to bar affirmative action plans of any type."'
Still for now, whether in favor of affirmative action or opposed to it, most
will welcome the "murky ground" as a temporary truce based on a "delicate
balance.
,157
Id. at 2362 (footnote omitted).
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2356 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Thomas goes even further and challenges the whole concept of "selective admissions" and
reliance on a "racially skewed" Law School Admission Test. Id. at 2360-61. The court should not
allow schools to use these principles and then try to reduce their impacts by overlaying these with
explicit racially discriminatory admissions programs. Id. Schools, like Michigan, are "seek[ing] only a
facade-it is sufficient that the class looks right, even if it does not perform right." Id. at 2362. See
George B. Shepherd, No African-American Lawyers Allowed: The Inefficient Racism of the ABA's
Accreditation of Law Schools, 53 J. Leg. Educ. 103 (March 2003).
153. See Jeffrey Selingo, Decisions May Prompt Return of Race-Conscious Admissions at Some
Colleges, Chron. Higher Educ. S5 (July 4, 2003) (indicating that state schools in the states covered by
the Fifth Circuit, which were barred by Hopwood from any affirmative action programs, would be
reinstating their programs); see supra nn. 80-84 and accompanying text.
154. See Curt A. Levey, Colleges Should Take No Comfort in the Supreme Court's Reprieve, Chron.
Higher Educ. Bll, Bll-14 (July 18, 2003). The Center for Equal Opportunity has already filed three
complaints with the Office of Civil Rights in the Federal Department of Education, arguing that
programs designed to increase minority representation violate the law and has sent "warning letters" to
thirty others. Wingert & Rosenberg, supra n. 141, at 10.
155. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346.
156. See Peter Schmidt, Affirmative-Action Fight is Renewed in the States, Chron. Higher Educ. A19
(July 18, 2003).
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